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Abstract 
 
In the midst of fighting a global War on Terror, the U.S. Army is concurrently attempting to 
transform to a more agile and deployable organization, which is centered largely on the 
integration of new information technologies into its command posts.  While most Army leaders 
are reporting that many of these new information “tools” such as the Army Battle Command 
System (ABCS) give them an unprecedented level of situational awareness and are beginning to 
enable a new style of war labeled by some as Network Centric Warfare, other leaders are 
reporting that the integration of this new digital technology comes with some unintended 
consequences that in some cases actually slows and decreases the quality of information flow by 
orders of magnitude.  We studied the “Brigade Unit of Action” concept with specific emphasis 
on the Brigade’s ability to disseminate and process information within and between command 
posts, using System Dynamics as a modeling tool to help better understand the impact of various 
policy decisions made by the U.S. Army.  Our study concentrated on some of the possible 
strengths and pitfalls of NCW theory, and led to the formulation of five heuristics that Army 
leaders should consider when developing the future command and control architecture for the 
Brigade Unit of Action. 
 
 
 
 2 
Introduction 
As the U.S. Army conducts transformation in the midst of an ongoing information driven 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the War on Terror, there has been an increasing 
emphasis placed on the need to develop leaner, more agile, versatile and deployable forces.   
Much of this initial effort has focused on improving the “tooth to tail” ratio of Army forces and 
transferring from a Cold War “Divisional” force structure to one focused around more 
deployable and sustainable Brigade Units of Action.1  Ironically, this transformation to what is 
supposed to become a more lean and deployable force structure has produced larger and more 
heavily staffed battalion, brigade and division command posts.  Despite introduction of the Army 
Battle Command System (ABCS), a system of digital systems that are intended to help speed up 
the Army’s ability to transfer information, improve situational awareness, make decisions, and 
maneuver on the battlefield, in some aspects the Army may have actually taken a step 
backwards. 
 
Unfortunately, these larger command posts are becoming more hierarchical and bureaucratic, 
and are often decreasing the Army’s ability to get ahead of the enemy’s decision cycle.  Our 
research examined one small aspect of this problem, the architecture of the Battalion Tactical 
Operations Center (TOC), and its interaction with its higher and subordinate headquarters within 
the Brigade Unit of Action.  Our research began with an extensive literature review of the latest 
Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and other current military literature, and included a number of 
interviews with U.S. Army officers.  Most of these officers were Captains who served as 
Company Commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan, and as Battalion, Brigade and Division 
Assistant Operations Officers in charge of daily TOC operations.  We then developed a System 
Dynamics Model (SDM) that would allow us to simulate the impact of various policy decisions 
on the quality of information flow both within the Battalion TOC (internal information flow) and 
between the Battalion TOC and both its higher Brigade Headquarters and its subordinate 
Company Headquarters (external information flow). 
 
 
                                                
1 In this paper, the terms Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and Brigade Unit of Action are used interchangeably.  Both 
describe a combined arms capable, Brigade size combat unit, consisting of approximately 3,000 to 3,500 soldiers. 
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Background and Context 
Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the First Gulf War in the early 1990s, two major trends 
have begun to revolutionize the face of war.  The first is the change in the nature of the threats 
faced by the United States and its allies, and the second is the recent surge in the creation of new 
information technologies.  In the case of the first trend, increased world instability and the 
elimination of a peer rival has forced America’s “weaker” enemies to adopt asymmetrical 
capabilities, while the U.S. Army has also been called on to operate against a more distributed 
threat and on noncontiguous battlefields (e.g. Afghanistan and Iraq).  These two changes to the 
nature of the contemporary operating environment has forced Army leaders to re-look practically 
every aspect of its current organization and policies, which has produced many changes.  
Concurrently, new information technologies including the internet and satellite digital and voice 
communications have led to new theories on war such as NCW and Effects Based Operations 
(EBO), both of which many believe will help the U.S. and its allies to win not only against the 
rise of a peer competitor, but will also help it to deal with new asymmetrical threats. 
 
In creating new Brigade Units of Action, Army leaders hope to create lighter, more deployable, 
and logistically sustainable units that can deploy anywhere around the world and conduct full 
spectrum operations (offensive, defensive, stability and support).  The linchpin to the new 
Brigade Units of Action operational concept is a family of digital information systems, similar to 
the ABCS, which is being developed and integrated into the Brigade using a spiral development 
and integration model.  Nevertheless, despite these new digital information tools, the Brigade 
Unit of Action’s hierarchical architecture and Battalion TOC layout has not changed 
significantly from the traditional configuration.  What has changed, is the size of the TOC and 
the amount of communications and computer equipment as well as personnel needed to operate 
this equipment.  Figures 1-3 below depict a simplified hierarchical architecture of the new 
Brigade Unit of Action, an example of a typical Battalion TOC layout, as well as a diagram 
depicting the composition and interaction of the ABCS systems, which are enabled by a 
combination of both line of sight and satellite communications technologies. 
 4 
 
Figure 1 (Simplified Brigade Unit of Action C2 Architecture) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 (Typical Battalion TOC Configuration) 
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Figure 3 (ABCS Systems Concept)2 
 
Much of the focus in creation of the Brigade Units of Action, as well as discussion found among 
various authors within NCW and EBO literature, is centered on how new digital systems such as 
the ABCS will affect the interconnectivity and command relationships between units.3   Central 
to this debate is discussion over whether a centralized or distributed (sometimes called network) 
command structure is optimal.  To date, there has not been any revolutionary changes to Figures 
1 and 2, with the exception that the TOCs and Command Posts at all levels (Company, Battalion, 
and Brigade) are becoming larger in physical size, equipment, and personnel; and that the time to 
transfer information between hierarchical levels within the Brigade organization is often taking 
longer than desired. 
 
                                                
2 RAND, p. 54. 
3 Specifically, much discussion is taking place regarding how new digital systems such as the ABCS in Figure 3 will 
affect the traditional hierarchical architecture shown in Figure 1, as well as how they will fit into and change the 
configuration of the Battalion TOC as in Figure 2. 
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System Dynamics Modeling 
In our attempt to better understand the various aspects of this problem, we began by constructing 
two conceptual, high-level, System Dynamics models that would help us to better understand the 
effects of various feedback loops involved with internal and external TOC information flow.    
Shown below is the conceptual model that we developed for Internal TOC Information Flow. 
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Figure 4 
As shown in Figure 4 above, there are three critical reinforcing feedback loops and one key 
balancing loop that affect the Quality of Internal Information Flow as determined by manning 
requirements, bureaucracy, size and human factors.  The critical endogenous variables in this 
model are Quality of Information Flow which is a dimensionless variable that measures the 
Quality of Information Flow on a scale of 0-10, with 5 being “normal.”  Other key endogenous 
variables are Actual TOC Manning, Shift Length, and TOC Manning Requirements.  The critical 
exogenous variables are Complexity of Operations and Creation of New Digital Systems.  As 
evidenced from our literature review and interviews with officers, the complex nature of current 
U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan calls for an increased number of functions to be 
conducted within the TOC.  This includes a greater amount and increased types of information to 
be transferred between TOCs, placing greater requirements on the flow of information within the 
TOC, not to mention increased manning levels.  The second variable, Creation of New Digital 
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Systems has led to an increase in the number of systems on the market and therefore a greater 
appetite to acquire these systems and place them inside the command post to help in enhance 
information flow.  These systems include the ABCS systems, as well as additional laptop 
computers, plasma/LCD screens, radios, etc. 
 
After developing the conceptual System Dynamics model for internal information flow, we then 
created a causal loop diagram to help us better understand the effects of the different variables 
and feedback loops that affect the Quality of External Information Flow.  The dynamics involved 
with external information flow are somewhat different than those involved with internal 
information flow.  The critical feedback loops affecting the Quality of External Information Flow 
are Digital System Acquisition, and Connectivity and Learning, as depicted in Figure 5 below. 
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Figure 5 
 
As shown above in balancing loop B2, an increase in the Quality of External Information Flow 
lowers the Perceived Need to Improve Digital Systems.  As the Perceived Need to Improve 
Digital Systems decreases, the Number of Digital Systems Used for Communications decreases, 
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and over time the Capability of Communications Systems decreases, which results in a decrease 
in the Quality of External Information Flow.  Concurrently, as the Quality of External 
Information Flow increases, the Quality of Lessons Learned inside the TOC also increases, 
which leads to the acquisition of appropriate digital and signal equipment, which then improves 
the Maturation of Digital and Signal Equipment and therefore improves the Quality of External 
Information Flow.  While these two loops alone would produce some variation of S-shaped 
growth in the Quality of External Information Flow, two other exogenous variables are critical in 
this model.  The first is the Desire to Improve External Information Flow, which produces a 
constant increase in the Perceived Need to Improve Digital Systems.  While this has a positive 
effect on external information flow, as can be seen in Figures 4 and 6, it also has the unintended 
consequence of leading to an increase in TOC Manning and therefore an increased size and 
bureaucracy of TOCs, which decreases the quality of internal information flow.  The second 
critical exogenous variable here is the Number of Hierarchical Barriers within an Organization.  
An increase in the number of hierarchical barriers means that there are more TOCs or “nodes” 
through which the information must be sent, with a delay occurring at each node.  Therefore, an 
increase in the Number of Hierarchical Barriers ultimately produces a decrease in the Quality of 
External Information Flow as information has a higher propensity to arrive late. 
 
Finally, Figure 6 below shows the combination of the Internal TOC Information Flow model and 
the External TOC Information Flow model into one combined conceptual System Dynamics 
model.  The key link between the two models is the variable Number of Digital Systems Inside 
TOC.  Appendix B shows the actual low-level System Dynamics model used for this study.  It is 
much more complex than the conceptual models described here but is based on the same major 
concepts.4 
 
 
 
                                                
4 For a fully documented version of the model, please contact the authors. 
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Figure 6 
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Simulation Results 
After formulating our System Dynamics models for this study, we then conducted a number of 
simulations to see what further insights could be learned from the model.  We used a 
combination of both “one variable at a time” testing as well as using various arrays.  In this short 
paper, we only cover the findings that were discovered from the “one variable at a time” 
approach, however, the simulations using arrays also corroborated our findings discussed below. 
 
Impact of Increasing Complexity of Operations on Information Flow 
The first simulations that we conducted looked at the impact that increasing complexity of 
Operations has on both Internal and External Information Flow.  In the low-level model, this 
variable was called Simultaneous Full Spectrum Operations (SFSO).  SFSO measured the 
additional functional areas that are needed inside the TOC as mission sets become more diverse 
(i.e. when Army units are expected to conduct multiple operations simultaneously as has been 
the case in Iraq and Afghanistan).  The model considers a value of four additional functional 
areas to be normal.  Experimental trials were conducted by raising the value of SFSO by 2 at a 
time for a total value of six, eight, and ten additional functional areas inside the TOC (The 
baseline functional areas considered are Operations, Intelligence, and Fire Support).  Additional 
Functional areas are considered to be specialties such as Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations 
(PSYOPS), Air Defense, Aviation, Information Operations, Police Liaison Officers, 
Reconstruction Teams, etc.  Figure 7 shows how the exogenous variable SFSO was changed in 
each of the experiments, while Figure 8 depicts the fairly significant negative impact that an 
increase in SFSO (or Operational Complexity) has on internal information flow and the lesser 
but not insignificant impact that SFSO has on external information flow. 
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Internal Information Flow
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Impact of Increasing Number of Digital Systems on Information Flow 
 
The next four simulations were conducted by manipulating the exogenous variable “New Digital 
System Development.”  As the low-level System Dynamics model in Appendix B shows, 
increasing the “New Digital System Development” increases the “Creation of New Digital 
Systems” which increases the “Digital Systems on the Market.”  In short, these variables 
represent the creation of new digital systems produced by both private and government 
industries.  The model considers a value of zero to be normal, therefore representing the situation 
prior to 1995 when early digitalization of Battalion TOCs began (note: the time horizon for the 
simulation is 12 years, thus simulating the time period from 1995 to 2007).  Experimental trials 
were conducted by raising the value of New Digital System Development from zero, to one new 
system every six months, then to one new system every two months, and finally to one new 
system per month.  The exogenous variable was changed at 30 months.  Figure 9 demonstrates 
how changes in the exogenous variable New Digital Systems Development was manipulated 
during each experiment.  Figure 10 shows the impact that increasing Digital Systems on the 
Market has on the system.  As the graphs indicate, increased Digital Systems on the Market 
produces a significant decrease in Internal Information Flow and a very modest decrease in 
External Information Flow.   
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Impact of Number of Hierarchical Barriers on Information Flow 
 
The next four simulations were conducted by manipulating the exogenous variable “Number of 
Hierarchical Barriers.”  In short, this variable measures the number of Hierarchical Barriers 
involved with transmittal of information between TOCs or between command and control nodes.  
For example, it is not normal practice for Army units to share information laterally, which places 
hierarchical barriers to information flow on the system.5  In the model, a value of four 
hierarchical barriers is normal.  At the tactical level where Platoons are the primary units of 
maneuver, these barriers are at Company, Battalion, Brigade and Division levels.  Simulations 
                                                
5 Lower levels in the Army are normally more likely to share information laterally than higher levels.  For example, 
many company commanders encourage lateral reporting of operational events between platoon leaders, where the 
company command post monitors this discussion as well.  But, this is not the organizational norm, and most often 
focus is on reporting information vertically in the organization. 
 13 
were conducted by decreasing the value of Hierarchical Barriers from 4 to 3, then to 2 and 1.  
What this represents is moving from a stove-piped hierarchical reporting system to where 
information is shared laterally throughout the network of command and control nodes.  The 
following graphs show the impact of changing the Number of Hierarchical Barriers on the 
system.  The exogenous variable was changed at time = 30 months or t = 30.  Figure 11 indicates 
how changes in the exogenous variable Number of Hierarchical Barriers were manipulated 
during each simulation.  Figure 12 shows the impact that decreasing the Number of Hierarchical 
Barriers has on the system.  As the graphs show, decreased Hierarchical Barriers has an almost 
insignificant impact on Internal Information Flow, but has a tremendously positive impact on 
External Information Flow.   
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Heuristics 
The following five heuristics result from the synthesis of material discussed in both the literature 
review of our original study and findings from our analysis using the System Dynamics Model 
described above.6  These heuristics are intended to provide a concept for future design 
improvements of the Brigade Unit of Action command and control architecture and the Battalion 
TOC.   While they do not completely support all tenets of current NCW theory, they do clearly 
support the majority, while also providing guidance to help avoid some of the potential pitfalls of 
NCW theory. 
 
1)  A flatter C2 Architecture will lead to improved quality and timeliness of information flow.  
This is clearly supported by both the findings of our System Dynamics simulations, current 
NCW literature, as well as interviews with current U.S. Army Officers.  This requires 
elimination of the stove-piped command and control structure, focusing on lateral reporting and 
transmittal of intelligence across the organization in lieu of stove-piped vertical reporting.  It also 
includes a change from “push” to “pull” information flow.  Figures 13 and 14 provide a visual 
depiction of this heuristic. 
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6 Contact author for original thesis which contains the entire literature review and a more detailed description of the 
modeling process used for this study. 
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Figure 13 Current BCT C2 Architecture 
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Figure 14 Transformation to a Flatter C2 Structure 
 
2)  Switching the locus of power control by distributing authority within the organization 
facilitates and enables a flatter C2 architecture and will improve information flow and the 
ability make decisions and act faster than the enemy.  Modern wars are fought by platoons and 
companies.  New digital C2 capabilities give these platoons and companies an unprecedented 
real time view of the battlefield and therefore an improved ability to make decisions while 
understanding the larger context.  In order to expand the locus of power control cultural change 
is required.  Currently, the Army’s least experienced people (Lieutenants with no experience and 
Captains with normally less than seven years experience) command these “edge” organizations.7  
In order to effectively transfer decision making ability from centralized to distributed control, the 
Army should consider placing more experienced people in these positions (i.e. senior Lieutenants 
and junior Captains with three to six years experience as platoon leaders and senior Captains or 
junior Majors with eight to twelve years experience as company commanders).  This would 
require changes to the entire Army personnel manning system and therefore much study would 
                                                
7 See Alberts and Hayes’ “Power to the Edge” for a more thorough discussion of this heuristic. 
Transformation 
To 
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be needed to determine how to best implement this system.  But in the context of the 
Contemporary Operating Environment and the information revolution, it no longer appears 
optimal to have the most experienced people staffing brigade headquarters and above, while the 
least experienced people are in a position to make timely and critical decisions on the battlefield. 
 
3)  Applying Lean thinking to help maintain a smaller sized BN TOC will improve the 
flexibility and agility of the organization by improving the quality and timeliness of 
information flow.  The simulation results derived from the System Dynamics model for this 
study clearly suggests the importance of this, as does the literature review section and interviews 
with Army officers.  In order to accomplish this, special attention should be paid to how many 
digital systems are needed in the TOC, and eliminating those that do not create sufficient value 
for the organization to justify an increase in equipment and manning.  Critical to this endeavor is 
understanding that more does not necessarily mean better.  Indeed, as the System Dynamics 
model shows, more equipment and people can produce inferior results.  In addition, it is critical 
to minimize the manning of the digital systems that are added to the TOC.  Also, as the 
Contemporary Operating Environment and non-contiguity of the battlefield require more 
functions to be accomplished within the TOC, it is important to minimize the number of people 
who are added to the TOC to accomplish these functions by asking: Can one person accomplish 
two or more functions?  Can a particular function be accomplished by one or two people in lieu 
of five or six?   
 
4)  Switching from deliberate to more expedited decision making techniques and procedures 
will increase the speed of command and improve the flexibility and agility of the organization.  
The current Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) is a very long and laborious process that 
is symptomatic of the current focus on objective-specific problem solving style of command and 
control.  Switching to a command focused system such as the mission-specific philosophy of 
command and control supports NCW theory and will improve the flow of information and the 
speed of command within the Brigade and the BN TOC.  Figure 15 demonstrates some of the 
different command and control philosophies available.  Also, switching from the lengthy MDMP 
to an expedited process such as the Recognition Primed Decision Making (RPDM) should also 
be considered.  Indeed, our findings are very clear in support of this heuristic, as an expedited 
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decision making process would result in less planners and therefore less people and equipment 
inside the TOC, therefore increasing the quality of internal information flow. 
 
Figure 158 
 
5)  Improved Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capability within the Brigade 
Unit of Action, and a switch from push to pull intelligence will improve information flow and 
the ability to act faster than the enemy.  As previously mentioned, the current stove-piped 
hierarchy focuses on reporting vertically within the organization.  This translates to critical 
intelligence being stored and processed for lengthy periods of times at the highest levels of the 
organization (usually at levels above the BCT such as Division and Corps).  As our System 
Dynamics model showed, this unnecessary hierarchy within the information flow process 
produces a decrease in the timeliness and therefore quality of external information flow.  By 
creating a database where all members within the hierarchy can access information, lower level 
organizations can pull the intelligence they need from higher organizations in a timely manner.  , 
This will help them to make decisions and action target packages much faster than they have in 
the past.  Ultimately, this will improve the Brigade Unit of Action’s ability to act faster than its 
adversaries, and achieve unprecedented dominance on the battlefield. 
 
 
                                                
8 Alberts, Understanding Information Age Warfare, p. 170. 
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Conclusions 
In light of the current changes to the contemporary operating environment, organizational and 
institutional change is undoubtedly necessary in order to ensure success in the future, as well as 
the contemporary battlefield.  Indeed, history is full of examples of great armies and great 
nations that fell because of their inability to adapt to changes in technology and socio-political 
conditions. 
 
This study assists in the effort to better prepare the U.S. Army for both contemporary and future 
battles, by providing a set of heuristics that could be used to help guide future architectural 
enhancements to both the BCT C2 Architecture and to organization of the BN TOC.  Further 
study is needed to determine how to best implement each of these five heuristics, and to 
determine to what extent each of them should be implemented.   
 
This study also demonstrates the ability of System Dynamics to be used as a tool to help better 
understand the complex nonlinear relationships and feedback loops involved with understanding 
military command and control problems. 
 
In addition, this study demonstrates some of the strengths and weakness of both hierarchical 
command and control structures and network structures.  Specifically, the System Dynamics 
modeling process suggests that a network structure, as argued for by NCW theorists, is likely to 
lead to greatly enhanced external information flow, but with the unintended side effect of 
slowing internal information flow if care is not taken to limit the amount of people and digital 
systems added to the TOC. 
  
Perhaps one of the best areas for concentrating future study would be to help find the balance 
between a hierarchical and network structure, and between centralized and decentralized 
command and control.  Like many things in nature, the optimal solution is most likely not one 
system or the other, but a harmonious relationship somewhere between the two extremes. 
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Appendix A:  Acronyms 
 
ABCS  Army Battle Command System 
ADA   Air Defense Artillery 
AFATDS Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System 
ALO  Air Liaison Officer 
AMDWS Air and Missile Defense Work Stations 
ASAS  All Source Analysis System 
BFT  Blue Force Tracker 
BN  Battalion 
BOOT  The connection between the main tent and a connected vehicle. 
C2  Command and Control 
C4ISR Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance 
CA  Civil Affairs 
CAS  Close Air Support 
CDR  Commander 
CO  Company 
CP  Command Post 
CSSCS Combat Service Support Computer System 
CTCP  Combat Trains Command Post 
DNVT  Digital Non-Secure Voice Terminal 
EBO  Effects Based Operations 
FBCB2 Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade-and-Below 
FSE  Fire Support Element 
FCS   Future Combat Systems 
G2  Designates the Intelligence Section of the General Staff. 
MCS  Maneuver Control Station 
MCS-L Maneuver Control Station- Light 
NBC  Nuclear, Biological and Chemical 
NCO  Network Centric Operations 
NCW   Network Centric Warfare 
OODA Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (AKA Boyd Cycle) 
OPS  Operations 
RTO  Radio Telephone Operator 
S1 Personnel Officer/ Section (S denotes BN or BCT Staff, G denotes 
General Officer Staff (Division and Above)) 
S2  Intelligence Officer/Section 
S3  Operations Officer/Section 
S4  Logistics Officer/Section 
S6  Signal Officer/Section 
SIGACTS Significant Activities 
STU-III Secure Telephone Unit- Third Generation 
TACSAT Satellite Radio 
TOC  Tactical Operations Center 
XO  Executive Office (2nd in Command) 
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